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A SEPTENNIUM OF ENGLISH CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 1932-1939*
ROBERT WYNESS MILLARt
In essaying to survey briefly such recent developments in the
procedure of civil causes under the English Supreme Court Rules
as would be of interest to the profession in America, we fix the
year 1932 as the point of departure. For that year marked the
emergence of the so-called "New Procedure"-an innovation
which, under proper conditions, might have operated signifi-
cantly to alter the complexion of the system at large, but which,
for reasons presently to be noted, was disestablished after a life
of some five years. Something, however, of its influence remained,
as marked by certain changes in the ordinary procedure asso-
ciated with the exit of the experimental system. Other changes
there have been in the period under notice, some resulting from
statute but most from amendments of the Rules. While, apart
from the abolition of the New Procedure, these amendments of
the Rules are not of any spectacular character, they nevertheless
include measures which, along with the statutory changes, de-
serve attention on the part of students of procedural reform.
THE NEW PROCEDURE AND ITS ABOLITION
Introduced by amendment of the Rules in 1932, the New Pro-
cedure had its theatre in the King's Bench Division. Its purpose
was that of expedition, which it sought to accomplish in the
main by
(1) abridgement of the time ordinarily allowable for the
taking of the preliminary procedural steps; (2) return of
the summons for directions before the Judge instead of be-
fore the Master and consequent direct regulation by the
former of the preparatory matters in the cause, * * *; (3)
restriction of the right to trial by jury; and (4) enlarge-
ment in various particulars of the directive power of the
Judge with relation to the particular cause.1
* The present paper is concerned solely with the procedure under the
Rules of the Supreme Court. In particular, it does not take into account the
Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1937, or changes in County Court practice.
' Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. Millar, The "New Procedure" of the English Rules (1932) 27 Ill. L.
Rev. 363, 363-364. For the New Procedure generally, see the same article
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But the new system was not available for all causes in the
King's Bench Division. Certain were specifically withheld from
its province, and a substantially untrammeled discretion was
vested in the judge to exclude others. Subject to these limita-
tions, its application, save in some slight measure, was left to
the parties, either of whom was entitled to take steps, at the out-
set of the cause, to bring about this application. 2
The operation of the New Procedure was the subject of con-
sideration by the Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business
at Common Law, which was appointed in 1934. From its report,
under date of 20 January, 1936, it appears that the measure
had met with much favor in London, Where, in 1934, for example,
1,207 cases out of a total of 3,248 were dealt with under its
terms, but that in the provinces it was of no moment. This
difference was attributed to the fact that the new system in-
cidentally gave the judge power to fix a date for the trial-a
circumstance not of importance outside of London, since at the
assizes an approximate date for trial would be given in any
event.3
From the standpoint of procedural structure, by far the most
significant feature of the New Procedure was its transfer of the
hearing on summons for directions from the master to the judge.
The underlying idea here was that, by the change, there would
be an opportunity for the trial judge to become acquainted with
the case in advance-as manifested by the provision that "the
action shall, as far as possible, be tried by the Judge who heard
the summons for directions" (0. 38 A, r. 9 (2))-and, further-
more, although the matter of appeals from the master to the
judge has never loomed very large, there would be a complete
obviation of such appeals in the cases affected. This practice had
worked well in the Commercial Court where it had long been in
force. Theoretically it had much to commend it, even when ap-
plied on the larger scale of the New Procedure, but its installa-
tion here signally failed to take into account considerations re-
and also Ball, The New Procedure Rules 1932, Annotated and Explained(1932); Davies, The English New Procedure (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 377;
Armstrong, English Law Reform and the New Rules of Procedure (1933)
19 A. B. A. J. 77.
2. Millar, supra note 1, at 364-365.
3. Report of the Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business at Com-
mon Law (1936) 15, 16.
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lating to the availability of judicial personnel. From 1910 to
1915 the King's Bench Division consisted of the Lord Chief
Justice and seventeen puisne judges, which latter were rein-
forced by two additional judges in 1935. Upon the judicial force
thus constituted demands were constantly made for other work
than the regular civil business in London. Apart from the mat-
i er of holding the assizes on circuit, taking approximately one-
third of the whole judicial time, and certain miscellaneous drafts
upon that time, one judge was furnished to the Court of the
Railway and Canal Commission, another to the Central Criminal
Court, and three to the Couit of Criminal Appeal. While the last
mentioned assignments were not full-time ones, they nevertheless
represented an element materially detracting from attention to
civil business in the London lists. 4 Assignment, therefore, of
judges to hear New Procedure cases was a very different matter
from the corresponding thing in the Commercial Court, where as
a rule no more than one judge is sitting, and the business is not
sufficient to engross the whole time of even one judge.5 Hence,
as the situation developed, it was found that the maintenance of
the New Procedure was distinctly detrimental to the other busi-
ness of the Division, in causing this-and especially non-jury
cases coming under the ordinary procedure-to fall into arrears.
Said Mr. Justice Goddard, in a memorandum quoted in the
Report of the Commission:
The disadvantage of the New Procedure is that its success
is, I think, obtained at the expense of the non-jury list. Not
only are two judges working at it every day, but to enable
cases to be tried on the allotted days recourse is often had to
other judges. * * * I have known as many as four courts on
one day occupied with New Procedure cases. It seems to me
an important question whether the success to which I have
referred is not bought at too high a price. The languishing
state of the ordinary non-juries is apparent, and is, I think,
a source of resentment both to the Bar and to litigants.,
Then, too, even with this sacrifice of the interests of other
business it was very far from being always the case that the
4. Id. at 13, 14. Under the terms of the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Amendment) Act (1935) 25 Geo. V, c. 2, adding the two judges, vacancies
occurring in the nineteen judicial positions referred to are not to be filled
without consent of Parliament, so long as seventeen puisne judges are in
office.
5. Id. at 16-17.
6. Id. at 21.
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judge who heard the summons was the judge who presided at
the trial. Thus it appeared that at the Michaelmas sittings, 1934,
in 83 cases out of 194, the trial judge was other than the judge
who gave directions. And, at best, in the larger number of cases
there appeared but slight gain from the transferred hearing.
Says the Report before cited:
When cases are short and simple, there is no great scope for
the exercise of judicial influence. At the present time in the
New Procedure List the judge disposes of about ten sum-
monses each day in 20 to 40 minutes. This does not suggest
complication, and in fact the summonses in this list are
generally conmon form and rarely involve much controversy
between the parties.7
In the light of these and kindred considerations the Commis-
sion concluded that on the whole
the advantage of having had the summons for directions
dealt with by the trial judge in that small proportion of
cases which are neither settled nor tried by another judge
does not justify what the Lord Chief Justice has called "the
very serious inroad upon judicial time" involved.8
Accordingly the Commission recommended that "the summons
for directions, except in the Commercial List, should be taken
by the master.", It also recommended, inter alia, that the minor
rules of the New Procedure and of the ordinary procedure should
be assimilated, that non-jury cases should be divided into two
lists according to the estimated time of trial, and that the New
Procedure List should be incorporated in the short non-jury
list.1 As a result the Rule Committee, under date of 17 Decem-
ber, 1937, by revoking the Rule (0. 38 A) which had established
the New Procedure and by various amendments-particularly a
recasting of the Rule (0. 30) concerning the summons for direc-
tions-carried into effect the recommendations just mentioned
as well as other recommendations of the Commission's Report.
JOINDER OF CLAIMS
Actions for the Recovery of Land. The freedom as to joinder
of causes of action by the same plaintiff against the same de-
fendant, existing from the outset of the Rules, has been since
7. Id. at 82.
8. Id. at 82.
9. Id. at 105.
10. Id. at 103.
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1883 subject, as part of the slight restriction imposed, to the
provision (somewhat enlarging the corresponding provision of
1875) that, unless by leave of court, no cause of action might be
joined with one for the recovery of land
except claims in respect of mesne profits or arrears of rent
or double value in respect of the premises claimed, or any
part thereof, and damages for breach of any contract under
which the same or any part thereof are held, or for any
wrong or injury to the premises claimed [0. 18, r. 2].
An amendment of 1937 has now widened the field of this ex-
ception by adding to the money claims mentioned "claims for the
payment of principal money or interest secured by or for any
other relief in respect of a mortgage or charge of such land."
This change conforms to certain alterations in 1936 and 1937 of
0. 55, r. 5 A, as to proceedings on the part of mortgagees and
mortgagors. It does not affect actions for foreclosure, in which
possession of the land might always be recovered by the mort-
gagee, under proper circumstances, but does cover the case of a
suit by the mortgagee for possession in which he seeks a judg-
ment for the mortgage debt-a form of proceeding which seems
to be frequently used.- In any case, the importance of the
change is limited to dispensing with the need of judicial per-
mission for the joinder.
Actions against Joint Tart-Feasors. Determination, on the
part of the plaintiff, of the question of joinder in actions against
joint tort-feasors has become materially affected by the reflex
action of statutory change concerning the effect of a judgment
against one of a number of such tort-feasors. So accustomed is
the profession in almost all the American jurisdictions to the
rule that the plaintiff may sue one or more, less than the whole
number, of joint tort-feasors and recover judgment, without
merging his claim against those not sued, that we are apt to
forget that at common law the rule was otherwise, with the
result that where suit had been prosecuted to judgment against
those sued, this judgment accordingly might be pleaded as a
bar to a later suit against the other or others. In departing from
the old position the American courts have generally held that
when the judgment has been satisfied, then and then only will it
11. See the form of order appropriate in such a case, Annual Practice(1940) 1844, no. 40.
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be considered that a bar has arisen. The common law rule,
recognizing the bar whether or not there has been satisfaction
of the judgment, as definitely settled in the leading case of
Brinsmead v. Harrison,'12 continued to be followed in England
until 1935, when it was set aside by the Law Reform (Married
Women and Tort-feasors) Act of that year.13 This declares that
in case of damage arising from a tort,
judgment recovered against any tort-feasor liable in respect
of that damage shall not be a bar to an action against any
other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a joint
tort-feasor in respect of the same damage [Section 6 (1)
(a)].
By way of regulating the ensuing situation, the act further
provides that in case of a plurality of actions against joint tort-
feasors, "the sums recoverable under the judgments given in
those actions by way of damages shall not in the aggregate
exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment
first given"; but costs are not to be awarded in any of the later
actions, unless the court is of opinion that there was reasonable
ground for bringing the action (Section 6 (1) (b)).
Some trenchings upon the common law principle denying the
right of contribution among tort-feasors we already know in
this country, as the result of legislation and judicial decision,"4
but the act in question, for the purpose of complementing its
scheme of recovery, goes to the full extent of establishing the
opposite principle. It provides that any tort-feasor liable in re-
spect of the damage in question "may recover contribution from
any other tort-feasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable
in respect of the same damage" except where the former is under
an obligation to indemnify the latter in that regard (Section 6
(1) (c)). The court is given wide power over the contribution
proceeding. The amount recoverable as contribution is to be
"such as may be found by the court just and equitable," having
regard to the extent of the contributor's responsibility for the
damage. It is also authorized to exempt any person from liabil-
ity in this respect or to direct that the contribution to be recov-
ered shall amount to a complete indemnity (Section 6 (2)).
12. (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 584, aff'd (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 547.
13. (1935) 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 30.
14. 18 C. J. S., Contribution (1939) 14, sec. 11.
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PLEADING
Except under the New Procedure 5 and except also for the case
of a special endorsement of the writ looking to summary. judg-
ment under Order 14, the Rules, prior to 1933, contained no
general time-requirement for the delivery of the pleadings, the
time being fixed by the master on the hearing of the summons
for directions. In the year last mentioned, however, change was
made in this regard. It was now provided that, except where the
writ of summons was indorsed with or accompanied by a state-
ment of claim under the summary judgment practice, the plain-
tiff was to deliver his statement of claim either with the writ or
at any time not later than ten days (in the Chancery Division,
twenty-one days) after the defendant's appearance (0. 20, r.
1) ."3 Similarly, the defense was to be delivered within fourteen
days from the time limited for appearance or from the delivery
of the statement of claim, whichever should be later (0. 21, r. 6).
No extension of time was permissible in either case except by
order, but in 1936 a further amendment provided for extension
by consent in writing of the opposite party (0. 20, r. 1; 0. 21,
r. 6). But application in the meantime for summary judgment
would take the defendant from without the fixed-time rule for
the delivery of his defense, which then, if leave to defend were
given, would be due within such period as the master might
appoint.
Concurrently with the change of 1933, the matter of reply was
re-regulated. Under the pre-existing rule, except in admiralty
actions, a reply other than in answer to a counterclaim could be
delivered only by order of court. Necessity for an order was now
dispensed with, but the reply, if used, must be delivered within
seven days from the delivery of the defense (0. 23, r. 1). Plead-
ings subsequent to reply, however, continue to depend upon order
of court. Reply to counterclaim, as before, stands on its own
basis: it is controlled by the provisions governing the delivery
of the defense (0. 23, r. 2.).17
15. Under the New Procedure the statement of claim was to be delivered
not later than seven days after appearance, the defense within seven days
after delivery of the statement of claim or within four days after appear-
ance, whichever period should last expire. 0. 37 A, rr. 4, 5 (1).
16. Probate actions and admiralty actions in r'em are here governed by
special provisions. 0. 20, rr. 2, 3.
17. See Annual Practice (1940) 426-427.
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In 1936 a change also occurred in respect of the defensive
pleading in actions to recover land. Previously a defendant in
such an action who was in possession by himself or a tenant was
not required to plead his title, unless his defense depended upon
an equitable title or estate or he claimed relief upon any equi-
table ground against the title asserted by the plaintiff. It was
enough for him to state his possession, under which allegation he
might prove any defense other than those mentioned. This lati-
tude, in some sort, was an inheritance from the procedure in the
old action of ejectment and in keeping with the rule that the
plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title.18 It has
now undergone a restriction in that the defense must be specially
pleaded not only where it is of the equitable character indicated,
but also where the defendant "is in possession by virtue of a
lease .or tenancy granted by the plaintiff or his predecessor in
title" (0. 21, r. 21). Apparently the consideration here operat-
ing was that in this case it is only fair that the plaintiff should
be specifically apprised of the title claimed by the defendant.
Related closely to the matter of pleading is a development
occurring in 1936 in the matter of patent actions. An amend-
ment then made to the special provisions as to directions in these
actions (0. 53 A, r. 21 A (2)) included the authorization of
directions
for the delivery of statements signed by counsel setting out
all the contentions whether of fact or law (including con-
tentions as to the construction of the specification or other
documents) upon which the parties respectively intend to
rely.
These statements are not pleadings, but operate by way of am-
plification and supplementation of the pleadings. It is significant,
however, that, apparently for the first time in the English sys-
tem, they enable the parties to put on paper in a preparatory
writing, an express statement of the legal theories on which they
respectively intend to proceed.
SUMMONS FOR DIRECTIONS
During the New Procedure r~gime, the master, it will be un-
derstood, continued to hear the sammons for directions in other
18. See observations of Brett, L. J., in Lyell v. Kennedy (C. A. 1882)
20 Ch. D. 484, 490.
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than New Procedure matters and thus in the greater number of
cases. But before the change of 1933 in the time for delivery
of pieadings, the plaintiff in general was required to take out
summons for directions at any time after appearance and before
any fresh step in the action other than an application for in-
junction or receiver or for judgment in default of pleading.
Thus, except when the writ was specially indorsed in contempla-
tion of summary judgment, the summons for directions was
taken out in advance of any pleadings, the time for which, if
pleadings were determined upon, was then appointed by the
master on the hearing of the summons. The establishment by
general rule of a fixed time for the delivery of the pleadings
compelled concurrent amendment of the requirement as to sum-
mons for directions, which the plaintiff", was now to take out
"within seven days from the time when the pleadings shall be
deemed to be closed" (0. 30, r. 1 (a)). With the abolition, how-
ever, of the New Procedure in December, 1937, came a re-state-
ment of the provisions in reference to the powers exercisable on
this hearing. Under this re-statement (0. 30, r. 2) the authority
of the master 20 on the hearing in question extends to the follow-
ing matters :21
19. In admiralty actions, actions in which directions have been given on
application for summary judgment, actions pending on application for
transfer to the Commercial List or transferred thereto, actions for infringe-
ment of a patent or any proceeding commenced by originating summons,
there is no such duty laid upon the plaintiff, but either party is at liberty to
take out summons for directions. 0. 30, r. 1 (c).
20. This authority, according to the general scheme of the Rules, is
conferred in terms of its bestowal upon "the court or a judge." The King's
Bench masters have all the powers of a judge sitting in chambers, with
certain specified exceptions, as have also the registrars in the Probate,
Divorce, and Admiralty Division. 0. 54, r. 12. The Chancery masters
stand on a different basis. "In theory every order made in Chambers in the
C. D. is the order of the judge, but the Masters in that Division are his
representatives, and every application in Chambers comes before them in
the first instance. The judge gives directions to these officials (0. 55, r. 15)
as to the particular matters which are to be referred to him in person, and
the rules also except certain matters from their jurisdiction (0. 51, r. lb,
0. 55, rr. 10a, 15, 15a, 35a)." Annual Pactice (1940) 2202. Express power
is given to the judges of the Chancery Division, subject to the Rules, to
"order what matters shall be heard and investigated by their masters, either
with or without their direction, during their progress." 0. 55, r. 15. So
far as he deals with the summons for directions, the Chancery master,
unlike the King's Bench master, is thus exercising an authority in effect
delegated to him by the judges.
Apart from the matter of summons for directions, it should be noted
that, by amendment in 1937 of 0. 54, in accordance with certain recom-
mendations of the Royal Commission, the authority of the master has been
Washington University Open Scholarship
534 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
(a) In accordance with the former practice, he may make all
proper orders in relation to discovery and inspection of docu-
ments, interrogatories, inspections of real or personal property,
and admissions of fact or of documents.
(b) He may direct the place and -mode of trial, including the
determination whether there shall be trial by jury. This in itself
is not a new power, but for the King's Bench Division the mas-
ter's authority in this respect is now added to, inter alia, by the
provision (0. 36, r. 1 A (1)) that his order is to contain an
estimate of the length of the trial, is to assign the case to the
appropriate list, and may direct that application be made to the
judge in charge of the list to fix a day for the trial.
(e) He may order that "any particular fact or facts may be
proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be
read at the trial" on reasonable conditions. But no order of the
kind is to be made where it appears "that any party reasonably
desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and
that such witness can be produced." It is also open to the master
to "order that any witness whose attendance in court ought for
some sufficient reason to be dispensed with, be examined before
a commissioner or examiner." These provisions were formerly
a part of the evidence Rules (0. 37, r. 1), the power in question
being conferred on the court or a judge to be exercised "at any
time," but they are now specifically incorporated in the Rules
governing the summons for directions.
(d) He may, similarly, "order that evidence of any particular
fact or facts, to be specified in the order, shall be given at the
trial by statement on oath of information and belief, or by pro-
duction of documents or entries in books, or by copies of docu-
ments or entries or otherwise" as he may direct. Except for the
words "at the trial," this provision had been previously in force,
enlarged in various particulars as to ex parte applications, including addi-
tion of the power to grant leave to effect service out of the jurisdiction. See
Ball, The New Rules of Procedure, December 17, 1937 (1938) 8.
21. It is now expressly declared that directions may be given not only on
the hearing of the summons but "at any later time before judgment."
0. 30, r. 2 (1), amendment of 23 December, 1938. And the Rules are
further explicit to the effect that the powers mentioned in paragraphs (a),
(c), (d), (e), (g), and (h), of our text (in addition to that of paragraph
(f), which is the subject of a special Rule (0. 37,A)) may be exercised by
the judge at the trial. 0. 37, r. 1.
For the special provisions as to directions in patent cases, see 0. 53 A,
r. 21 A.
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dating from 1894. It was then construed, however, by reference
to the statute-the Judicature Act of 1894-on the authority of
which it rested, to relate (apart from proceedings to distribute a
fund or property) only to evidence on the hearing of the sum-
mons for directions and not to evidence at the trial.22 In view of
the wider rule-making authority obtaining under the Consoli-
dated Judicature Act of 1925,23 the new Rule has made the pro-
vision in terms apply to evidence at the trial. In this, as regards
documentary statements, it seems to have anticipated in some
sort the innovating measures in that respect prescribed by the
Evidence Act of 1938.24
(e) He may "order that no more than a specified number of
expert witnesses may be called." This was taken over from the
New Procedure Rules (0. 38 A, r. 8 (1) (k)), previously to
which the Rules were silent on the point.25
(f) He may appoint the court expert provided for by a Rule
adopted in 1934.20 This Rule (0. 37 A, r. 1), in conferring the
power to appoint upon the court or a judge apparently vested
this power in the King's Bench master as well as the Admiralty
registrar,2 7 but the appointment is now by the new version of
the Rule under discussion expressly lodged within the ambit of
the summons for directions.
(g) He may "record any consent of the parties either wholly
excluding their right of appeal or limiting it to the Court of
Appeal or limiting it to questions of law only." Here, again, the
New Procedure has been levied upon (0. 38 A, r. 8 (2) (k)).
(h) He may "make such order as may be just with respect to
pleadings and particulars"-a power which in substance he has
exercised from the outset of the Rules.
(i) As authorized by a further amendment, made in 1938, en-
visaging the situation consequent upon the legislation of 193528
in reference to joint tort-feasors, he may to a certain extent deal
22. Rainbow v. Kittoe (Ch. D. 1916) 140 L. T. Jo. 412.
23 (1925) 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49.
24. See infra, page 539.
25. Under the prior practice, limitation to two experts on a side, unless
special circumstances otherwise required, was the rule established by
Tomlin, J., for his own court. Graigola Merthyr Co. v. Swansea Corp.
(1927) W. N. 30.
26. See infra, page 538.
27. Annual Practice (1940) 696.
28. See supra, page 530.
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with the matter of contribution. That is to say, when a plurality
of tort-feasors are sued together and one claims contribution in
the same proceeding from the other or others, the master may
order that a written offer of contribution be treated for the
purposes of the claim as a notice of payment into court. This
means that with the making of such an order, if the claimant
does not accept the offer but insists on pursuing the claim, he
does so at his peril with respect to the important matter of
CoStS.
20
(j) And, finally, the master may "revoke or vary any such
order." Before the adoption of this provision it appears to have
been the case that the master's power to revoke or vary an order
after it had been drawn up was limited to the case of an order
fixing the place and mode of trial.30
It should be added that the time after which a defendant may
apply to the judge for dismissal of the action on account of the
plaintiff's failure to take out a summons for directions was, in
1933, conformably to the changes then made in the rules of
pleading, altered from "fourteen days from the entry of the de-
fendant's appearance" to "seven days from the time when the
pleadings shall be deemed to be closed" (0. 30, r. 8).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In 1933, the then existing scope of the summary judgment
practice which-apart from claims for specific performance, here
admitted in 1927-was confined to certain enumerated cases of
liquidated money demands, claims for possession by landlord
against tenant and claims for the recovery of specific chattels,
became widened in important measure. Besides the common law
actions already included, it was now made applicable to
all other actions in the King's Bench Division (except ac-
tions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false impris-
onment, seduction or breach of promise of marriage, and
actions in which fraud is alleged by the plaintiff) [0. 3, r. 6
(4); 0. 14, r. 1].
The application in the case of specific performance is dealt with
by the Chancery Division (0. 14 A), as it is also in the case of a
claim "for the possession of any property forming a security
29. See on this point as to payment into court, Odgers, Pleading and
Practice (11th ed. 1934) 226.
30. Annual Practice (1940) 500.
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for the payment of money" (0. 3, r. 6 (3 A); 0. 5, r. 5 A),
which was a further addition to the category of summary judg-
ment cases made in 1937.
JURY TRIAL
Before the New Procedure Rules there was an absolute right
to jury trial in all "pure common law actions."'31 By these Rules
it was materially cut down, inasmuch as they left it to the judge's
discretion to grant or withhold such a trial. But, as the new
system did not apply to actions for libel, slander, malicious
prosecution, or breach of promise of marriage, the right re-
mained unaffected in these cases as well as in cases where the
parties had not elected for the application. In 1933, however,
Parliament intervened and by the Administration of Justice
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of that year 32 established the
rule for the King's Bench Division generally that trial by jury
should rest in the discretion of the court, with certain specified
exceptions resembling the cases excluded from the New Proce-
dure. That is to say, under the act, the action was to be ordered
tried by jury, on the application of either party if
the court or a judge is satisfied that (a) a charge of fraud
against that party; or (b) a claim in respect of libel, slan-
der, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or
breach of promise of marriage, is in issue * * * unless the
court or judge is of opinion that the trial thereof requires
any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or
any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveni-
ently be made with a jury [Section 6 (1)].
Thus, apart from this limited category of excepted cases, the
question of jury trial or not was made a matter to be determined
by the master on the hearing of the summons for directions.
Obviously the discretion of the master here covered that very
considerable item of judicial business, actions for damages aris-
ing from motor car accidents, commonly referred to in England
as "running-down cases." And what may strike an American
lawyer as curious is the fact, learned by the writer, on a visit to
the London courts in 1938, that in cases of this character, it was
oftenest the defendant who applied for jury trial, being induced
31. Ball, The New Procedure Rules 19832, Annotated and Explained
(1932) 16.
32. (1933) 23 & 24 Geo. V, c. 36.
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thereto by the disposition of the judges to give larger awards of
damages than would ordinarily a jury.
A further change has since come about in consequence of the
War. By the Administration of Justice (Emergency Provisions)
Act of 1939,38 the discretion of the court, in the present matter,
has been extended to all civil cases under the provision that
there is to be no trial by jury "unless the court or a judge is of
the opinion that the question ought to be tried with a jury"
(Section 8 (1)). The same act, as to civil cases, has provided
that, "it shall not be necessary for the jury to consist of more
than seven persons" (Section 7 (1)). Moreover, it has raised
the upward limit of age for jury service from sixty to sixty-five
years (Section 7 (3)). These provisions, it will be understood,
are for the duration of the emergency only, being subject to
termination by Order in Council (Section 11 (2)).
EVIDENCE
The Court Expert. A new Rule adopted in 1934 (0. 37 A)
dealt with the matter of expert evidence. It provides that
in any case which is to be tried without a jury involving
any question for an expert witness, the Court or a Judge
may in his discretion at any time on the application of any
party appoint an independent expert (to be called "the Court
expert") to inquire and report on any question of fact or
of opinion not involving questions of law or construction
(hereinafter called the "issue for the expert") [0. 37 A,
r. 1].
The report, which is to be made in writing, is to be treated as
information furnished the court and given such weight as the
court thinks fit (Ibid., r. 2). Any party within fourteen days
after receipt of a copy of the report is to be at liberty to apply
for leave to cross-examine the expert on his report, and such
cross-examination may be ordered to take place either at the
trial, or before an examiner prior to the trial (Ibid., r. 3). The
selection of the expert and the settlement of the questions to be
submitted to him, are, in the absence of agreement of the parties,
to be by the court (Ibid., r. 4). Provision is made for experi-
ments or tests by the expert (Ibid., r. 5). On reasonable notice,
either party, at the trial, is to be at liberty to call not more than
33. (1939) 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. '78.
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one expert witness, provision being made for two or more in
exceptional cases (Ibid., r. 8). Where more than one expert
issue arises, more than one court expert may be appointed to
report on the respective issues (Ibid., r. 9). The term "expert"
as here used is to include "scientific persons, medical men, engi-
neers, accountants, actuaries, architects, surveyors and other
specially skilled persons whose opinions on any question rele-
vant to the issues involved would be received by the Court"(Ibid., r. 11).
This provision establishes an important check upon the evils
of biased expert testimony, familiar enough to us here in Amer-
ica. And it is interesting to note that in the provision for a
written report there is a decided approach to the Continental
systems wherein the expert does not fall into the category of
witnesses, but is looked upon as a distinct means of proof. The
reservation, however, of the right of the parties to cross-examine
the court expert and of each to call at least one expert witness
of his own choosing, operates to preserve every legitimate ad-
vantage attaching to the orthodox Anglo-American mode of pro-
ceeding.
Notice to Admit Documents. The Rules, from the beginning,
have enabled either party to call upon the other to admit the
genuineness of a given document. This measure, indeed, goes
back to the Hilary Rules of 1834. 34 But, until 1937, the only
penalty attendant upon unreasonable failure to admit, whether
occurring by disregard of the call or by express refusal to admit,
was the imposition of costs, that is to say, the expense of proving
the document. Now, by one of the amendments of the year last
mentioned, made pursuant to a recommendation contained in the
report of the Royal Commission, it is provided that in the event
of a failure to give notice of non-admission within six days from
the date of the notice to admit, the offending party "shall be
deemed to have admitted the document, unless the Court or a
Judge otherwise orders" (0. 32, r. 2).
Changes under the Evidence Act, 1938. Some highly impor-
tant reforms in the law of evidence have resulted from the
Evidence Act of 193835 In the first place, the act has enlarged
34. Reg. Gen. H1l. T. 4 Will. IV, reg. 20, 1 Chitty, Pleading (11th Am.
ed. 1851) 735.
35. (1938) 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 28.
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the field of exceptions to the hearsay rule with respect to docu-
mentary statements. It provides that "in any civil proceedings
where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any
statement made by a person in a document and tending to estab-
lish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be
admissible as evidence of that fact," subject to two principal
conditions. The first of these is that the declarant either "had
personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement,"
or "where the document in question is or forms part of a record,
purporting to be a continuous record, made the statement (in
so far as the matters dealt with thereby are not within his per-
sonal knowledge) in the performance of a duty to record infor-
mation supplied to him by a person who had, or might reasonably
be supposed to have, personal knowledge of those matters." The
second condition is that the declarant shall be called as a witness.
But satisfaction of this second condition is excused if the declar-
ant "is dead, or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition
to attend as a witness, or if he is beyond the seas and it is not
reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, or if all reason-
able efforts to find him have been made without success" (Sec-
tion 1 (1)). Moreover, even if the declarant is available, the
court is given power to admit the statement without requiring
his attendance, where undue delay or expense would otherwise
be caused. And, present the same consideration, the court is
empowered to permit a copy, properly certified, to be used in
place of the original document (Section 1 (2)).
Further provisions guard against abuse of the evidentiary
right thus accorded. The statement is not to be admitted if made
"at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated in-
volving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend
to establish (Section 1 (3)). Along with this negative provision,
is the positive one that to be made by a party within the mean-
ing of the statute, it must appear that the document or its mate-
rial part was "written, made or produced by him with his own
hand, or was signed or initialled by him or otherwise recognized
by him in writing as one for the accuracy of which he is re-
sponsible" (Section 1 (4)). And, finally, the court, in case of
trial by jury, is given the wide discretionary power to reject the
statement, notwithstanding satisfaction otherwise of the condi-
tions of admissibility, "if for any reason it appears to be inex-
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pedient in the interests of justice that the statement should be
admitted" (Section 1 (5)).
The extent of the inroad thus made upon the pre-existing law
of evidence will be better appreciated when we consider that
England since the 1600s has not followed the shop-book rule,36
and that the rule as to entries in the regular course of business,
made by a person since deceased, has been much narrower than
generally in America, especially in its insistence upon a duty to
record on the part of the declarantY.7 The inadmissibility in his
own favor of the party's entries, resulting from the absence of
the shop-book rule, had been mitigated in some measure, first,
by the fact that in chancery proceedings the courts "for many
years acted upon the principle of admitting shop-books in evi-
dence where accounts had been required to be taken and vouch-
ers had been lost" ;38 and, secondly, by a provision of the Rules,
based upon a section of the Chancery Practice Amendment Act
of 1852,31 permitting the court, in taking an account, to direct
that the books of account "shall be taken as prima facie evidence
of the truth of the matters therein contained" (0. 33, r. 3). An-
other provision of the rules (which we have referred to in con-
nection with the summons for directions)4o concerning evidence
of particular facts "by production of documents or entries in
books, or by copies of documents or entries" was at one time
thought to relate to evidence at the trial,4' but was later held to
have no such application,'4 2 and without such application it re-
mained until its amendment in 1937. Whatever the precise effect
of the amendment, now obviously an academic question, it could
not have been aught but a negligible factor in the brief interim
preceding the legislation under discussion. Apart, therefore,
from the case of taking accounts and one or two statutory
authorizations in special cases,43 the only evidentiary advantage
36. For the history, see 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1518;
1 Taylor, Evidence (10th ed. 1906) sees. 709, 710.
37. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1524; Chamberlayne,
Trial Evidence (2d ed. 1936) sec. 878; 1 Taylor, Evidence (12th ed. 1931)
sec. 708.
38. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 37, at sec. 711.
39. (1852) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, sec. 54; Annual Practice (1940) 569.
40. See supra, page 534.
41. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 36, at see. 711, note 1 to p. 504.
42. Rainbow v. Kittoe (Ch. D. 1916) 140 L. T. Jo. 412.
43. Bankers' Books Evidence Act (1879) 42 Vict. c. 11, see. 3; Children
Act (1908) 8 Edw. VII, c. 67, sec. 124.
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of such entries, compensating for the lack of a rule like that of
the American shop-book doctrine, seems to have been their use as
memoranda to refresh recollection, 44 or, in accordance with what
appears to have been a fairly common practice,45 their admission
pursuant to agreement of the parties. Under these circumstances
the sweeping nature of the present reform is readily apparent.
The second departure made by the act in question relates to the
matter of attesting witnesses. It is provided that an instrument
required by law to be attested, other than a will or other testa-
mentary document "may, instead of being proved by an attesting
witness, be proved in the manner in which it might be proved if
no attesting witness were alive" (Section 3). This obviously per-
mits recourse to the handwriting of the attesting witness to
prove execution even though the attesting witness is available
for call to the witness-stand. Since enactments of 1854 and
186546 it has been the rule in England that resort to attestation
is necessary only when the document was required by law to be
attested, and it is to this class of cases that the present provision
is directed.
In the third place, the statute lightens the duty of proof in the
case of ancient deeds. It cuts down from thirty years to twenty
the time necessary for accrual of the presumption of due execu-
tion (Section 4).
And, finally, the act clarifies the powers of the Rule Committee
With respect to rules in relation to affidavit evidence. So far, as
previously seen, the Rule on this subject has not gone to the ex-
tent of denying the right of cross-examination if the affiant is
available. But the act envisages even this, by declaring that the
Judicature Act of 1025 authorizes
the making of rules of court providing for orders being
made at any stage of any proceedings directing that specified
facts may be proved at the trial by affidavit, with or with-
out the attendance of the deponent for cross-examination,
notwithstanding that a party desires his attendance for
cross-examination and that he can be produced for that
purpose [Section 5].
The power thus to dispense with cross-examination has been
44. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 37, at sec. 709. ,
45. Stone, The Evidence Act 1938 (1938) 85 L. Jo. 424.
46. Common Law Procedure Act (1854) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, sec. 26;
Criminal Evidence Act (1865) 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, sec. 7.
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viewed with misgiving. While the bill was under consideration
a contributor to the Law Times, referring to the proposed change
as "a very serious departure from established usage," expressed
the "hope that Parliament will take serious thought before al-
lowing it to be made.4 7 And after the passage of the act we find
a correspondent of the same journal saying:
Those of us who have been wondering how sect. 5 of the
Act was ever allowed to pass either House of Parliament are
still hoping (possibly, against hope) that the Rule Com-
mittee may refrain from exercising the power conferred
upon them. It appears to me that the proposal strikes at the
very foundation of the law of evidence which has prevailed
in this country from time immemorial.
4 8
We think that most of their American brethren would be dis-
posed to concur on this point.
MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION, CERTIORARI,
AND QUO WARRANTO
By statutory enactment of 1938 (Administration of Justice
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act) 49 it is declared that "the pre-
rogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari shall no
longer be issued by the High Court" (Section 7 (1)). The
jurisdiction before exercised by means of these writs was now
to be exercised by means of "an order requiring the act to be
done, or prohibiting or removing the proceedings or matter, as
the case may be" (Section 7 (2)). It is further provided that
"the said orders shall be called respectively an order of man-
damus, an order of prohibition and an order of certiorari"
(Section 7 (3)), and that "no return shall be made to any such
order, and no pleadings in prohibition shall be allowed, but the
order shall be final, subject to any right of appeal therefrom"
(Section 7 (4)). The same statute abolishes informations in
the nature of quo warranto. Where such an information would
47. (1938) 185 L. T. Jo. 242.
48. (1938) 186 L. T. Jo. 38. On this point, the view of the Royal
Commission stopped short of the authorization here in question. "The op-
posite party," it was said, "should not have an absolute right to require
the production of the deponent for cross-examination, but when the subject
matter of the affidavit is important and seriously disputed, or it is desirable
to compel a witness to submit himself to cross-examination, leave would no
doubt in practice be granted in proper cases." Report of the Royal Com-
mission on the Despatch of Business at Cmmon Law (1936) 79.
49. (1938) 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 63.
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have lain, the remedy was now to be afforded by writ of in-
junction and a declaration, if need be, that the office is vacant
(Section 9).
The simplification thus effected is understandable, but it would
seem to an outsider that the statute leaves the matter of man-
damus in a not altogether satisfactory condition. For there has
been, in addition to the prerogative remedy, an action for man-
damus which was first recognized by the Common Law Proce-
dure Act of 1854,51 and which, under the existing Rules, is
identified as any action in which the plaintiff claims "a man-
damus to compel the defendant to fulfill any duty in the fulfill-
ment of which the plaintiff is personally interested." The writ
of mandamus has had here no place: the "mandamus shall be
by judgment or order, which shall have the same effect as a writ
of mandamus formerly had" (0. 53, rr. 1, 4). While this variety
of mandamus was apparently instituted as ancillary to another
action, "and for the purpose of enforcing the private right in
respect of which the private litigation had arisen,"'r. the view
has been expressed that it may be claimed as an independent
matter.5 2 The course of decision does not seem to disclose any
clear-cut determination of the sphere of this remedy as against
that afforded by the prerogative writ. 3 Since under the statute
there is no more distinctive name now attached to the former
prerogative remedy than that of application for an order of
mandamus, this substantial fusion of Romenclature can only
tend further to obscure the line of distinction. The Rules which
have been adopted under the authority of the new act (0. 59,
as amended in 1938, r. 3 et seq.) add nothing by way of aid in
the differentiation of the two remedies.
APPEAL
Two important changes relating to appellate jurisdiction were
introduced by the Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act of
50. (1854) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 25, sec. 68.
51. Day, J., in Baxter v. London County Council (1890) 63 L. T. R.
767, 771.
52. Fotherby v. Metropolitan Ry. (1866) L. R. 2 C. P. 188.
53. See the cases cited in Annual Practice (1940) 976 and 9 Halsbury,
Laws of England (2d ed. 1933) 776-778, s. v. Crown Practice; and especially
(in addition to the two cases last cited) Bush v. Bevan (1862) 32 L. J.
Exch. 54; Regina v. Lambourn Valley Ry. (1888) 22 Q. B. D. 463; Regina
v. London & N. W. Ry. [1894] 2 Q. B. 512; Smith v. Chorley District
Council [1897] 1 Q. B. 532; Davies v. Gas Light & Coke Co. (C. A.) [1909]
1 Ch. 708.
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1934.24 The first is to append the universal requirement of leave
in the case of appeals from the Court of Appeal to the House of
Lords, without prejudice to existing restrictions on such appeals.
The leave may be granted either by the Court or by the House,
which latter is authorized to provide for the appointment of a
Committee to act upon petitions for the leave (Section 1). The
second change is to provide that appeals from the County Court
(with some statutory exceptions including bankruptcy matters)
shall go directly to the Court of Appeal, instead of being taken
initially to a Divisional Court of the High Court (Section 2).
Previously the direct appeal had been available only in a few
special cases.
EXECUTION ETC.
Existence of war conditions has dictated in the Courts (Emer-
gency Powers) Act of 193955 a series of provisions (Section 1)
applicable to the enforcement of judgments and other executory
titles. Thus by the general rule judgments and orders for the
payment of money may not be enforced by execution or other-
wise without leave of court. So far as purely civil matters are
concerned exceptions are recognized in the case of (a) judg-
ments for the recovery of damages for tort; (b) judgments or
orders for the recovery of debts under contracts made after the
commencement of the act; and (c) judgments or orders for the
payment of costs only. Similarly, leave is required in respect of
other enumerated proceedings for the realization of a plaintiff's
money demand, including the levy of a distress and, subject to
certain exceptions, proceedings for foreclosure or for sale in
lieu of foreclosure. The like requirement of leave is attached to
the enforcement of judgments or orders for recovery of posses-
sion of land in default of the payment of rent, or for the recov-
ery of possession by a mortgagee on account of default in pay-
ment of money, except (in both cases) where the contract in-
volved is one made after the commencement of the act. The
step thus taken, terminable on the passing of the emergency as
declared by Order in Council, has its precedent in legislation
enacted during the War of 1914-1918.56
54. (1934) 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 40.
55. (1939) 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 67.
56. (1914) 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 78.
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CONCLUSION
For the American student of procedural reform the high lights
of the development surveyed are the disappearance of the New
Procedure, the broadened scope of the summary judgment, the
provision for a court expert, the increased effectiveness of the
notice' to admit documents, and the changes made by the Evi-
dence Act of 1938 with respect to the admissibility of documen-
tary entries. By way of conclusion a word may be in order con-
cerning these steps as related to American efforts in a similar
direction.
As regards the abolition of the New Procedure, the interest
which the terminated experiment principally had for the pro-
fession on this side of the Atlantic lay in its transference of the
hearing on summons for directions from the master to the judge.
In America the assignment of this function to the master had
been looked upon as an especially advanced feature of the En-
glish system, and the departure led us to wonder whether, after
all, we had not overrated this feature. At the time, the present
writer took occasion to say of the experiment that "American
lawyers will watch its progress with more than ordinary interest,
for upon its outcome may depend in considerable measure the
trend of future procedural reform in the United States."57 Un-
fortunately the failure of the experiment has proved nothing in
one way or another as to the relative value of the preliminary
hearing before the judge as against that same hearing before
the master. For, as has been seen, the new system failed, not
because of any intrinsic reason, but simply for lack of a sufficient
number of judges to operate it without prejudice to other busi-
ness of the King's Bench Division. The particular outcome,
therefore, has bearing upon the matter of the American pre-
trial hearing, so widely the subject of discussion today, only to
the extent of warning us that while such a hearing is unques-
tionably calculated to save the time of the court as a whole, care
must be taken in its establishment, at least in the case of metro-
politan tribunals, to see that the internal economy of the court
is so adjusted to its administration as not thereby to impede
other judicial business. To some extent such a hearing may be
committed to masters or commissioners, but the general con-
57. Millar, The "New Procedure" of the English Rules (1932) 27 Ill.
L. Rev. 378.
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stitutional situation is such as to confine these officers to min-
isterial functions and thus to prevent them from exercising, on
their own account, any such judicial powers as are vested in the
King's Bench masters. As a result, the pre-trial hearing in
America, where it has been established, is usually a matter for
the judge, and the same system is likely to attend its future
adoptions-a circumstance which renders decidedly pertinent the
warning afforded by the English experiment. But, in this same
matter of pre-trial hearing, the recast version of the master's
authority on the summons for directions, accompanying the
supersession of the New Procedure, may profitably be studied
with reference to the regulation of the hearing and the powers
to be exercised in its conduct.
With respect to the summary judgment the trend exhibited is
in harmony with that prevailing in America. For the most part
the scope of the summary judgment where recognized with us
remains narrower than under the English provisions, but occa-
sionally embraces cases not coming within the latter. "Thus in
New York and Wisconsin, although the proceeding does not lie
in any case of tort demands, it is available in the case of a suit
to foreclose a lien or mortgage, or a suit to compel an accounting
under a written contract."5 8 But the new Federal Rules have
gone far beyond the English system in making the scope uni-
versal, that is to say, in permitting motion for summary judg-
ment to be made by any party "seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment." 9 Moreover, while the English Rules, as regards the de-
fendant, still confine the application to the case of a counter-
claim, Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as the Federal Rules,
enable the defendant to apply for summary judgment as a purely
defensive measure.
In the institution of the "court expert" as a means of minimiz-
ing the evils attendant upon the usually partisan attitude of
experts called by the parties, the Rules have followed the same
general direction already taken by a number of statutes in the
United States.c° The reform is one cogently advocated by Pro-
58. Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937 (1937)
50 Harv. L. Rev. 1017, 1055.
59. Rule 56, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States.
60. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 563.
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fessor Wigmore, with whose suggestions6 ' as to its regulation, it
is interesting to observe, the English provisions rather closely
coincide. With us, "legislative progress in the adoption of this
type of measure has been slow. But it is inevitably the way of
the future."62 A powerful aid in the desired progress is the draft
act of the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted in 1937, and approved the following year by the appro-
priate Committee of the American Bar Association. 3 This,
while differing from the provisions of the English Rules not only
in detail, but also in scope and principle, offers equally effective
means of placing expert testimony upon a proper basis.
The change effected in the case of the notice to admit docu-
ments, that is to say, attachment of the penalty of constructive
admission for ignoring the notice, in lieu of the imposition of
costs, is sufficiently conservative, judged by American standards.
The step in question, although marking a distinct advance, had
been anticipated in certain of the American jurisdictions,
namely, Massachusetts (1917)4 and Wisconsin (1931).G' More-
over, the English change is restricted to the case of documents
and does not apply to a notice to admit specific facts, whose
sanction for the case of failure to give notice of non-admission
remains on the former basis, while in Massachusetts and Wis-
consin the constructive admission worked by failure to heed the
notice applies both in the case of documents and of specific facts.
It is further to be remarked that the provision in like latitude
has entered into the new Federal Rules.66
As for the greatly widened admissibility in evidence of docu-
mentary entries resulting from the Evidence Act of 1938, this
to a certain extent has its American parallel in the model statute
recommended by a committee of the Commonwealth Fund in
192767 and which, with or without some variations, had already
61. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 969, sec. 563.
62. Id. at 970.
63. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) see. 563, where the text of the
draft is set out.
64. 8 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 231, see. 69.
65. Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 327.22.
66. Rule 36 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
.United States.
67. "Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book
or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act,
transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was
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been enacted in a number of American jurisdictions, 68 when in
1936, unmodified in substance, it was adopted by Congress for
the federal courts. 3 The American measure is addressed obvi-
ously to a narrower category of entries than is the English
statute, that is to say, to entries made in the regular course of
business. But within this category, except in point of the dis-
cretion conceded to the English court to admit copies in lieu of
the original document, it offers freer play. For, demanding only
that it should appear that the entry was made in the regular
course of business and that it was the regular course of business
to make such entry at the relevant time, it wholly dispenses with
personal knowledge on the part of the entrant as a condition of
admissibility, contains no counterpart of the English alternative
requirement that the entry form part of a continuous record
and be made under a specific duty to record, and does not insist
that there be any recognition in writing of the entrant's respon-
sibility for the accuracy of the entry. It is clear, therefore, that
the American statute is more adapted than is the English to
meeting the need of harmonizing the law of evidence with mod-
ern business methods. But both go far toward this end. In
America, it is clear, the constant pressure of this need is bound
to bring about enactment of legislation of the kind in increasing
degree.
Viewing our own situation in the light of the developments
surveyed we find no occasion for pessimism. Here and there, in-
deed, we have in some respects advanced even farther toward
simplification and expedition than has the English system. While
in some quarters the existing order of things is still regarded
with too much complacency, the events of these last years, and
made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular
course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of
such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time there-
after. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record,
including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be
shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The
term business shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of
every kind." Morgan and others, The Law of Evidence (1927) 63.
68. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1520; Chanberlayne, Tiial
Evidence (2d ed. 1936) sec. 894. See also the proposed statute of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws patterned upon that of the Common-
wealth Fund, but containing the requirement that the entry be testified to
by the person who made it or supervised its making. Wigmore, loc. cit.
69. Act of June 30, 1936, 49 Stat. 1561, c. 640, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 695.
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particularly the adoption of the Federal Rules of 1938, betoken
marked progress. To a very considerable extent the conditions
of jury trial remain unsatisfactory, as do also what may be
called the "administrative circumjacencies"7 ° of procedure, but
even here there are reassuring signs. On the whole, especially
with the powerful influence proceeding from the new Federal
Rules, we have every reason to count upon an accelerated march
to improvement throughout the American jurisdictions.
70. Millar, The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure (1937) 14
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1 and 197, 224.
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